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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
The US Troop  
Withdrawal Plan
Bogus Strategic Claims and a 
Warning Signal for Europe
1 Press conference by US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper: <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/
Transcript/Article/2292996/department-of-defense-senior-leaders-brief-reporters-on-european-force-posture/> 
(accessed August, 24, 2020).
2 See also: John R. Deni “Three questions on US troops moving from Germany,” Military Times, July 30, 2020: 
<https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/30/3-questions-on-us-troops-rebasing-from-
germany/> (accessed August, 24, 2020).
President Trump wants to withdraw 
US troops from Germany because it 
spends too little on defense. US Sec-
retary of Defense Mark Esper, how-
ever, is trying to present the decision 
as the result of a strategic analysis. 
That seems grotesque. The withdraw-
al not only weakens NATO, but also 
the security of Europe and America’s 
ability to act. The Europeans must 
finally close their capability gaps, and 
Germany must make its armed forces 
fully operational earlier than planned.
On July 29, 2020, US Defense Secre-
tary Mark Esper presented his concept 
to the public on how to implement US 
President Donald Trump’s decision to 
pull out US troops from Germany.1 He 
was assisted by General John Hyten, 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and General Tod Wolters, Com-
mander US European Command and 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Command-
er Europe (SACEUR). Contrary to the 
reduction of 9,500 military person-
nel initially announced, now, 11,900 
personnel are supposed to be moved. 
5,600 of these service members are in-
tended to be relocated to other NATO 
countries and approximately 6,400 
are supposed to return to the United 
States. The repositioning would reduce 
the number of US troops in Germany 
from about 36,000 to 24,000.2
While Trump repeated publicly that 
the reduction was a punishment for 
Germany’s refusal to spend two per-
cent of national GDP on defense (as 
agreed by the Alliance’s Heads of State 
and Government), Esper tried to create 
the impression that Trump’s arbitrary 
decision was the conclusive result of 
a well-thought-out political-strate-
gic analysis. Esper stated that his con-
cept was not only in line with the US 
National Defense Strategy of 2018, but 
also fulfilled five principles he had set 
out for its development: (1) enhance 
deterrence of Russia, (2) strengthen 
NATO, (3) reassure allies, (4) improve 
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strategic flexibility as well as the US 
European Commander’s operational 
flexibility, and (5) care for the service 
members concerned and their fami-
lies. Analysis of the proposed individual 
measures as they have been presented 
thus far, however, demonstrates that 
the concept largely fails to meet these 
principles.
Key elements of the proposed troop 
relocation include: (1) Moving Head-
quarters US European Command from 
Stuttgart to Mons (Belgium) where it 
would be co-located with the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE); (2) repositioning of the 2nd 
Cavalry Regiment, a brigade equipped 
with Stryker wheeled armored fighting 
vehicles, from Vilseck (Bavaria) back 
to the United States; (3) relocation of 
a F-16 fighter squadron from Spang-
dahlem (Rhineland-Palatinate) as well 
as two army battalions from Grafen-
wöhr (Bavaria) to Italy; (4) reposition-
ing of three brigade headquarters, an 
air defense artillery battalion, and an 
engineering battalion to Belgium; (5) 
moving elements of the Headquar-
ters V (US) Corps from the US to Po-
land (in addition to the reinforcements 
agreed upon by Poland and the United 
States last year encompassing, inter 
alia, some 1,000 military personnel). (6) 
Finally, US Stryker units would begin 
continuous rotations in the Black Sea 
region to ensure a more “enduring” US 
military presence there. 
The plan’s core is the withdrawal of the 
Stryker brigade from Europe, which 
would reduce the US land forces in Eu-
rope by practically a third – from three 
to two combat brigades. This is what 
matters most, politically and militarily. 
The US forces in Europe make a deci-
sive contribution to NATO’s deterrence 
and defense capabilities. They play a 
vital role in reinforcing Allies locat-
ed on the Alliance’s borders for their 
protection or defense. They serve as 
an essential deterrent in Europe. Con-
sequently, he who intends to relocate 
3 Ibid. 
a third of the US combat forces from 
Europe back to the United States (over 
a distance of more than 7,000 kilome-
ters), weakens deterrence, and does 
not strengthen it. The plan damages 
NATO’s credibility and cohesion; and it 
impairs the security of the Eastern Eu-
ropean Allies, as there would be fewer 
US combat units that could be rapidly 
deployed in regions where they would 
likely be needed most. 
The withdrawal plan also carries sev-
eral harmful political messages: the 
US is reducing its commitment to 
the security of its allies and snubs its 
main European ally Germany. Expe-
rience has shown that, contrary to 
Esper’s assurance, rotating units are 
not at their full strength. They signal 
less commitment and reliability than 
present troops (living with their fam-
ilies) who understand their mission 
precisely and constantly train for it.3 
Interoperability of allied forces would 
suffer. Moreover, a US withdrawal 
would be a unilateral disarmament 
move without a reciprocal Russian 
step. This would do a disservice to 
arms control and mutual disarmament 
in Europe since Moscow is continu-
ing its buildup of conventional forces 
in the Baltic region and has deployed 
intermediate-range nuclear-capa-
ble missiles that threaten almost all of 
Europe.
The claim that the Pentagon concept 
would increase the United States’ stra-
tegic f lexibility for deployments in 
Europe and other regions is not con-
vincing. Any deployment of forces 
from Germany – the central European 
hub – to peripheral regions, the Med-
iterranean, or the Near and Middle 
East (where America has strategic in-
terests), is faster, more effective, and 
more cost-efficient than from the US 
across the Atlantic. In addition, the 
Stryker brigade is not earmarked for 
possible deployments in the Indo- 
Pacific region, as Esper admitted in 
response to questions from media 
representatives.
It is equally obvious that positioning 
fewer troops in Europe does not in-
crease the ability to act of the Com-
mander US European Command, but 
rather limits it, even for military exer-
cises. He would lack the Stryker units 
for rapid reaction in a crisis in support 
of regions that are exposed to a poten-
tial direct military threat, for example 
the Baltic region. It is also incompre-
hensible as to why an air defense bat-
talion should be moved further west to 
Belgium when the battalion would be 
needed immediately in the east in the 
event of a crisis or conflict. Finally, the 
relocation of an F-16 fighter squadron 
from Spangdahlem weakens the fighter 
wing that would be indispensable as a 
first reinforcement in the Baltic region 
and for eliminating the anti-access/
area-denial systems in Kaliningrad. 
In Aviano, Italy, on the other hand, 
there is already a US F-16 fighter wing. 
Esper’s reasoning that the reposition-
ing would bring air forces from Ger-
many closer to the Black Sea region 
insults the knowledge of the experts.
The US is reducing its commitment 
to the security of its allies and  
snubbing its main European ally.
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From a military perspective, the merg-
ing of all units of the 173rd Airborne 
Brigade in Italy is plausible. Deploying 
elements of the Headquarters V Corps 
US to Poland for joint defense planning 
is welcome. It would also make sense 
to co-locate SHAPE, the Headquarters 
US European Command, and the US 
Special Operations Command in Mons 
since NATO’s SACEUR is, at the same 
time, Commander of all US forces in 
Europe. But is such a large command 
base necessary? In a war, it would be 
a priority target. The development of 
adequate infrastructure would take 
years and would be very costly, espe-
cially since the SHAPE building is in 
great need of renovation.
If overall deterrence is not strength-
ened and NATO is  weakened by 
reducing the responsiveness and ef-
fectiveness of US forces in Europe, 
there can be no talk of “reassuring 
allies.” While there is no doubt that 
the security of Romania and Bulgar-
ia would benefit from the presence of 
rotating US units, the security of East-
ern Europe as a whole, and especially 
that of the Baltic States, would be 
weakened. Additionally, Esper’s con-
cept means considerable uncertain-
ty for the affected members of the US 
armed forces. No one knows exactly 
where and when the personnel would 
be transferred – let alone whether the 
plan is even feasible.
Lieutenant General (retd.) Ben Hodges, 
former Commander US Army Europe, 
was recently quoted as saying that 
Secretary of Defense Esper had done 
his best to minimize the damage of a 
bad and false decision. One can sure-
ly agree with that. Details are not yet 
known. The concept is now being elab-
orated, but it remains a bogus strate-
gic claim. One can only hope that the 
representatives of the US Congress will 
understand not only the questionabil-
ity of the plan, but also the scale of its 
costs and the time needed to prepare 
the necessary infrastructure – and 
will therefore not be providing the re-
sources for its implementation.
Nevertheless, the plan is also a wake-
up call for Germany and Europe. The 
reliable commitment of the United 
States to the security of Europe re-
mains indispensable. This is also in 
America’s own strategic interest. If the 
United States wants to be able to with-
stand the growing great power com-
petition against China and Russia, 
Europe must remain a secure and sta-
ble partner. In the face of both grow-
ing regional and global challenges and 
dangers, as well as the global shift of 
power, all European nations must 
clearly do much more for their own se-
curity and the common transatlantic 
security, both politically and militarily.
The relocation plan gives Europe a 
taste of what it could be faced with if 
the United States is forced to really 
increase its strategic flexibility toward 
East Asia at Europe’s expense or re-
duce the forces and capabilities ear-
marked for reinforcement of Europe 
in a crisis. This would primarily con-
cern US air and naval forces, as well 
as those ground forces that are de-
ployable by air transport, such as the 
Stryker and the airborne brigades. 
Europe must finally fill the gaps that 
are emerging. For the German gov-
ernment, this means signif icantly 
accelerating achievement of the full 
operational readiness of its armed 
forces. Germany’s Defense Minister 
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer is aim-
ing for this by 2031 – which is too late.
The security of Eastern Europe as  
a whole, especially that of the Baltic 
States, would be weakened.
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